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Abstract: Ideological campaigns in post-Deng China have a strategic function of discerning 
loyalties of local leaders. Previous empirical studies find that Jiang Zemin’s followers are 
more likely to echo Jiang’s ideological campaigns. Through a content analysis of provincial 
newspapers between 2005 and 2012, this study suggests that the manner of displaying 
loyalties has completely changed. By employing a PCSE estimation, this study finds that 
protégés of both Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin are less likely to echo their patron’s ideological 
campaigns, suggesting the shifting function of ideological campaigns from monitoring 
identified followers’ loyalties to recruiting new followers. This article argues that this is a 
result of changing elite politics and – more importantly – the different strategic use of 
ideological campaigns.  
 
Introduction  
Thirty years of spectacular economic growth suggests that the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) has got its market reforms right. It has prompted a sizable political science literature to 
contend that the economic miracle led by market reform has become a principal if not the 
sole pillar of legitimacy in China on the one hand1 and the market reform has also rendered 
ideology obsolete on the other hand. 2 As such, the issue of ideological changes in post-Deng 
China is under-researched.3  
Yet, in China, ideology is still considered as crucial nowadays. My study of the Chinese 
elites’ debate on legitimacy – based on 125 articles in party school journals, university 
journals, and public policy journals between 2008 and 2012 – finds that ideology is 
                                                          
1 E.g.David Shambaugh, "The Dynamics of Elite Politics During the Jiang Era," The China Journal, no. 45 (2001); Zhengxu Wang, 
"Political Trust in China : Forms and Causes," in Legitimacy: Ambiguities of Political Success or Failure in East and Southeast Asia, ed. 
Lynn White (World Scientific Pub Co Inc, 2005); Dingxin Zhao, "The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and 
Contemporary China," American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 3 (2009); André Laliberté and Marc Lanteigne, "The Issue of Challenges to 
the Legitimacy of Ccp Rule," in The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century : Adaptation and the Reinvention of Legitimacy, ed. André 
Laliberté and Marc Lanteigne (London: Routledge, 2008); Zhengxu Wang, "Before the Emergence of Critical Citizens: Economic 
Development and Political Trust in China," International Review of Sociology 15, no. 1 (2005). 
2 E.g.Kalpana Misra, From Post-Maoism to Post-Marxism:The Erosion of Official Ideology in Deng's China (London: Routledge, 1998); 
David Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and "Though Work" in Reformed China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1999).:10; Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power (London: Foreign Policy 
Centre, 2004); June Teufel Dreyer, China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition, 8th ed. (Boston, MA: Longman, 2012).: 330, 
360; Peter Gries and Stanley Rosen, "Introduction: Popular Protest and State Legitimation in 21st-Century China," in State and Society in 
21st-Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation, ed. Peter Gries and Stanley Rosen (New York and London: Routledge, 2004).:16 
Although many studies have been focused on nationalism, this article does not consider them ideology. As Breslin argues, Chinese 
nationalism  “lack (s) sufficient coherence and guiding principles to be counted as an ideology as such- it is not a ‘science of ideas’”. Shaun 
Breslin, "Democratizing One-Party Rule in China," in New Challenges to Democratization, ed. Peter Burnell and Richard Youngs (London: 
Routledge, 2009). 
3 although the topic of ideology has been studied by a few western scholars such as Heike Holbig, Peter Sandby-Thomas, William Joseph, 
Yih-jye Hwang, and Florian Schneider among others   
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considered a leading strategy to maintain the party’s monopoly on power. 4 The party-state in 
China has invested great amount of energy and human capital in modernizing the ideology of 
the CCP from Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents”, Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Outlook of 
Development” and “Harmonious Society” to now Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. In the 
meantime, both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have launched waves of ideological campaigns – 
involving a great amount of government instructions, numerous meetings, and mobilization 
of thousands of propaganda units from the central government to the very bottom – to 
promote their new ideological banners, following by a series of major policy shifts.   
What are the functions of the ideological campaigns in post-Deng China? Previous 
literature suggests that a key function of ideological campaigns is to discern the loyalties of 
local leaders.5 Shih’s empirical study, based on provincial official newspapers between 2000 
and 2004, finds that provincial units that are governed by Jiang Zemin’s protégés are more 
likely to echo Jiang’s “Three Represents” campaigns.6 Building on Shih’s pioneering work, 
this study examines the manner of displaying loyalty through ideological campaigns in Hu 
Jintao’s era by analyzing the impact of factional ties on the provinces’ zeal to echo those 
campaigns.  
This study departs from the previous study in four ways. First, instead of studying the 
reaction of a single political group, this study examines how major dominant political groups 
– including Hu Jintao’s protégés, the “Shanghai Gang”7 and princelings8 – echo ideological 
campaigns. Second, instead of focusing on a single campaign, this study examines three 
ideological campaigns – including Scientific Outlook of Development, Harmonious Society, 
and Three Represents9 – in order systematically to study the strategic functions of ideological 
campaigns in post-Deng China. Third, while the previous study observes only five periods of 
time (2000-2004) with 22 provinces, missing important objects such as Tianjin, Guangdong 
and Guizhou, this study is based on eight periods of time (2005-2012) with all 31 Chinese 
provincial units except Shandong.10 Finally, this study also analyses whether the volume of 
patron-client ties with senior leaders have an impact on provincial leaders’ zeal to echo 
ideological campaigns. For example, if both the party secretary and governor of a given 
province are Hu Jintao’s protégés, this province may act different from others provinces that 
only have a leader who is a Hu Jintao’s protégé and different from the provinces that are 
governed by Jiang Zemin’s protégés.  
 When I examine the data between 2005 and 2012, this study finds that Hu Jintao’s 
protégés are less likely to echo Hu’s Scientific Outlook of Development campaigns and the 
“Shanghai Gang” are less willing to echo either Jiang’s Three Represents or Hu’s Scientific 
                                                          
4 Jinghan Zeng, "The Debate on Regime Legitimacy in China: Bridging the Wide Gulf between Western and Chinese Scholarship," Journal 
of Contemporary China 23, no. 88 (2014). A similar study of Gilley and Holbig, based on the data between 2003 and 2007, also finds that 
ideology is a leading prescription. Please see Bruce Gilley and Heike Holbig, "Reclaiming Legitimacy in China," Politics& Policy 38, no. 3 
(2010).  
5 Didi Tatlow, "Allegiance, the Privilege of the Party,"  New York Times (2013); Victor Shih, ""Nauseating" Displays of Loyalty: 
Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," The Journal of Politics 70, no. 4 (2008); Xiangwei Wang, "Xi 
Follows in Mao's Footsteps on Path to Consolidate Power," South China Morning Post 2013; Andre Lieber, "The Chinese Ideology: 
Reconciling the Politics with the Economics of Contemporary Reform," Journal of Chinese Politics Science 18, no. 4 (2013). 
6 Victor Shih, ""Nauseating" Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," The Journal 
of Politics 70, no. 4 (2008). 
7 This study uses Li Cheng’s definition of “Shanghai Gang” which is “current leaders whose careers have advanced primarily owing their 
political association with Jiang Zemin in Shanghai”. See Cheng Li, "The "Shanghai Gang": Force for Stability or Cause for Conflict?," 
China Leadership Monitor, no. 1 (part 2) (2001). 
8 In this study, princeling refers to state/party/military leaders who come from families of senior party leaders (vice minister or vice governor 
level or above) or military generals (deputy military region level or above). 
9 The case of Three Represents in this article is quite different from Harmonious Society and Scientific Outlook of Development because 
Jiang had already stepped down for several years, thus the reactions of “Shanghai Gang” and the variation of Three Represents during 2005 
and 2012 are not my major interests. The major aim of this article is to compare the reaction of Hu’s followers to Scientific Outlook of 
Development (2005-2012) with that of Jiang’s follower to Three Represents (2000-2004). 
10 The CNK database does not include the data of the Shandong provincial official newspapers Dazhong Daily during the relevant period.  
3 
 
Outlook of Development campaigns. In other words, all identified factional members are less 
likely to echo ideological campaigns – either Hu’s Scientific Outlook of Development or 
Jiang’s Three Represents – than those who have fewer connections with Jiang or Hu. These 
results indicate changing manner of displaying loyalty through ideological campaigns. 
Nowadays, ideological campaigns play a role of “recruitment” (recruiting new protégés) 
rather than “maintenance” (monitoring the loyalty of existing protégés).  
 This article argues that the shifting function of ideological campaigns is a result of 
changing elite politics and – more importantly – a different strategic use of ideological 
campaigns. Through ideological campaigns, Jiang Zemin intended to maintain influence after 
retirement, while Hu Jintao had less desire to do so. Notably, the purpose of this article is not 
to dispute the major functions of ideological adaptation and campaigns. Ideology, of course, 
has many functions and it has been playing a highly ambiguous role in China. The main 
purpose of this article is to uncover and analyse the pragmatic power motivation through 
ideological campaigns – how factional affiliations of local leaders have influenced their zeal 
to echo top leaders’ ideological banners in post-Deng China – that have not been discovered 
before.  
   
Ideological Campaigns in Contemporary China  
In Mao Zedong’s era, communist ideology used to be the lynchpin of legitimation in 
China for a couple of decades until a series of political campaigns and policy failure led to 
certain kinds of legitimacy crises. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, ideology and 
politicisation became the problem rather than the solution because people were sick of mass 
campaigns and ideology. Recognising people’s changing views, Deng Xiaoping capitalised 
on a less political approach after the death of Mao Zedong and the fall of the Gang of Four. 
Deng and his supporters chose to build state legitimacy on socialist democracy (democratic 
centralism) rather than ideology and political campaigns – and perhaps more clearly simply 
by placing economic reconstruction first.  
In the post-Deng era, however, ideology has returned to the agenda of the party-state. 
The party-state has put great efforts – with enormous money and human capital – in 
reinvesting its ideology. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao launched costly ideological 
campaigns to promote their ideological banners. So, what did motivate the return of ideology 
in post-Deng China? So far, the existing literature roughly offers two interpretations. The first 
view argues that the ideological adaptation has served as a legitimizing device for communist 
regimes,11  while the second view approaches ideology from a factional perspective that 
ideology is a factional tool to struggle for power.12 
                                                          
11 Heike Holbig, "Ideological Reform and Political Legitimacy in China," in Regime Legitimacy in Contenporary China: Institutional 
Change and Stability, ed. Thomas Heberer and Gunter Schubert (Routledge, 2009); Maria Bondes and Sandra Heep, "Frames We Can 
Believe In: Official Framing and Ideology in the Ccp's Quest for Legitimacy," (available at http://www.giga-
hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp187_bondes-heep.pdf access on April 24, 2013: German Institute of Global 
and Area Studies, 2012); Heike Holbig, "Ideology after the End of Ideology. China and the Quest for Autocratic Legitimation," 
Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013); Anne-Marie Brady, "Mass Persuasion as a Means of Legitimation and China's Popular Authoritarianism," 
American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 3 (2009); Bruce Gilley and Heike Holbig, "Reclaiming Legitimacy in China," Politics& Policy 38, no. 
3 (2010); Nora Sausmikat, "More Legitimacy for One-Party Rule? The Ccp’s Ideological Adjustments and Intra-Party Reforms?," Asien 99, 
no. S (2006); Xiaobo Su, "Revolution and Reform: The Role of Ideology and Hegemony in Chinese Politics," Journal of Contemporary 
China 20, no. 69 (2011); Peter Thomas, Legitimating the Chinese Communist Party since Tiananmen: A Critical Analysis of the Stability 
Discourse (Oxon: Routledge, 2011); Yih-Jye Hwang and Florian Schneider, "Performance, Meaning, and Ideology in the Making of 
Legitimacy: The Celebration of the People’s Republic of China’s Sixty-Year Anniversary," The China Review 11, no. 1 (2011).  
12 Joseph Fewsmith, "Studying the Three Represents," China Leadership Monitor  (2003); Yongnian Zheng and Liang Fook Lye, "Elite 
Politics and the Fourth Generation of Chinese Leadership," Journal of Chinese Political Science 8, no. 1&2 (2003); Victor Shih, 
""Nauseating" Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," The Journal of Politics 70, 
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The above cleavage lies in the primary audience and function of the CCP’s ideological 
discourses. I argue that there are two types of ideological discourses in China: formal 
ideology and informal ideology.13 Formal ideology refers to official ideological discourses 
that are narrowly concerned with the CCP’s discipline and the socialist doctrines, which were 
incorporated in the CCP constitution such as Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents, and Hu 
Jintao’s Scientific Outlook of Development. Informal ideology refers to those popular 
ideations that are broadly concerned with the justification of the one-party rule to the entire 
society, such as the promotion of nationalism/patriotism and the emphasis on virtue.  
The most important function of formal ideology is to redefine what is meant by 
socialism at that moment in time, and thus to provide an ex post facto justification of 
explaining why the current political economy is not incompatible with the CCP’s 
commitment to socialism.14 For example, Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” – “representing 
the demands for the development of advanced social productive forces, the direction of 
advanced culture, and the fundamental interest of the greatest majority of the people”15 – 
aimed to use these “represents” to redefine the CCP’s commitment to socialism and thus 
justify why the CCP’s quasi-capitalist economic policies were not incompatible with this 
commitment. In this sense, formal ideology is primarily produced for justifying the CCP’s 
existence to itself. When it comes to legitimizing the CCP’s authoritarian rule as a whole, this 
is the arena in which informal ideology takes place. In this way, formal ideology and 
informal ideology deals with the internal stability (party cohesion) and external stability 
(popular legitimacy) of the CCP respectively.  
Formal ideology also establishes ideological orthodoxy and a leader’s credentials. As 
formal ideology is clearly identified with specific leaders, it reflects the personal authority of 
Chinese leaders and thus carries a special meaning to assert their power. In this paper, 
ideological campaigns mainly refer to the promotion of formal ideology and I will focus on 
how those campaigns are used for power.   
Within the factional perspective, many argue that the adaption of ideology is an attempt 
to put a leader’s stamp on history and on the party.16 In this sense, the return of ideology is 
more about creating political legacy and maintaining senior leaders’ influence after they step 
down. However, it still leaves many questions unanswered. A single grand campaign is 
sufficient to create political legacies; so, why were ideological campaigns launched with such 
high frequency in post-Deng China? In addition, Scientific Outlook of Development alone 
was sufficient to preserve the influence of Hu Jintao, so why did the regime take the trouble 
to launch other campaigns such as Harmonious Society?   
Shih provides an additional dimension to the factional perspective. It is argued that 
political allegiance is a key function of ideological campaigns. 17  Through ideological 
campaigns, local political actors can pander to the top leader by praising his ideological 
banners. Local political actors take both political and social costs to pander to top leaders 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
no. 4 (2008); Andre Lieber, "The Chinese Ideology: Reconciling the Politics with the Economics of Contemporary Reform," Journal of 
Chinese Politics Science 18, no. 4 (2013); Zhiyue Bo, "Hu Jintao and the Ccp's Ideology: A Historical Perspective," Journal of Chinese 
Political Science 9, no. 2 (2004). 
13 Jinghan Zeng, The Chinese Communist Party's Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy and Party Cohesion (Palgrave Macmillan 2015). 
14 Jinghan Zeng, The Chinese Communist Party's Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy and Party Cohesion (Palgrave Macmillan 2015). 
15 English translation: Heike Holbig, "Ideological Reform and Political Legitimacy in China," in Regime Legitimacy in Contenporary China: 
Institutional Change and Stability, ed. Thomas Heberer and Gunter Schubert (Routledge, 2009). 
16 Joseph Fewsmith, "Studying the Three Represents," China Leadership Monitor  (2003); Yongnian Zheng and Liang Fook Lye, "Elite 
Politics and the Fourth Generation of Chinese Leadership," Journal of Chinese Political Science 8, no. 1&2 (2003). 
17 Didi Tatlow, "Allegiance, the Privilege of the Party,"  New York Times (2013); Victor Shih, ""Nauseating" Displays of Loyalty: 
Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," The Journal of Politics 70, no. 4 (2008); Xiangwei Wang, "Xi 
Follows in Mao's Footsteps on Path to Consolidate Power," South China Morning Post 2013; Andre Lieber, "The Chinese Ideology: 
Reconciling the Politics with the Economics of Contemporary Reform," Journal of Chinese Politics Science 18, no. 4 (2013). 
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publicly. 18  After Mao Zedong died, the CCP formed certain rules to against cults of 
personality; political actors who shamelessly praise a senior leader and thus violates this 
norm might be despised as a boot-licker. More importantly, junior leaders who pander 
through public grovelling to a senior leader suffer politically because they are unlikely to be 
recruited by another rival coalition if their patron falls from power. By bearing the cost of 
being despised by others and closing the door to alternative factions, the public grovelling 
through ideological campaigns sends creditable signals to senior leaders about political actors’ 
loyalties. In this way, senior leaders can identify which followers are truly loyal. In this sense, 
ideological campaigns serve as a way for local leaders to pander to senior leaders in order to 
win their trust and for senior leaders to discern loyalties of the local leaders.   
 The above theory is evidenced by Shih’s empirical study. By using content analysis to 
study provincial newspapers between 2000 and 2004, Shih finds that provinces that were 
governed by Jiang Zemin’s protégés were more likely to echo Jiang’s Three Represents 
campaigns. Thus, Shih contends that Jiang Zemin’s ideological campaigns have a function of 
monitoring followers’ loyalties so that the ruler can better prevent a coup.19 How about Hu 
Jintao’s ideological campaigns? Did Hu’s campaigns also have a function to monitor 
followers’ loyalties? There are good theoretical and empirical reasons to hypothesize that Hu 
Jintao’s ideological campaigns have different functions.   
 Theoretically, identified factional members might have other ways of displaying 
loyalties, such as supporting their patron’s action in the Central Committee by voting and 
protecting the family business of their patron in their governed areas. 20 They do not have to 
risk the political and social cost of over-praising their patron through ideological campaigns. 
To those officials who are not the top leader’s protégés and thus have far fewer connections 
to the top leader, ideological campaigns might be one of the few great opportunities to pander 
to the top leader in order to win their favour. It is reasonable that they will be more active 
than identified followers in echoing ideological campaigns. If so, ideological campaigns can 
function as a way for local officials to pander to senior leaders in order to be recruited into a 
coalition. In this sense, it is theoretically possible for ideological campaigns to play the role 
of recruiting new followers rather than monitoring existing followers’ loyalties. 
 Empirically, Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents campaigns are different from that of Hu’s. 
First, obtaining information about followers’ loyalties was much more important to Jiang 
Zemin than to Hu Jintao. Elite politics during Hu Jintao’s era has been far more stable than 
that of Jiang. Jiang Zemin was appointed by Deng Xiaoping as the top leader in a sudden 
decision because of the protest of 1989. At the beginning of Jiang’s appointment, many 
considered Jiang to be a temporary leader who would soon be removed. This was because 
Jiang, as a party bureaucrat without any power bases, was too weak and vulnerable to be 
surrounded by his veteran colleagues, such as Yang Shangkun who was a revolutionary 
leader, the President of the People’s Republic of China, and the vice chairman of the Central 
Military Commission. Arguably, Jiang had to rely more heavily on loyal followers in order to 
stay in power; otherwise, he might be overthrown by powerful rivals.   
 On the contrary, Hu Jintao’s position as the party head had never been seriously 
challenged, although factional struggle remained intense in Hu’s term. Nowadays, factional 
                                                          
18 Victor Shih, ""Nauseating" Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," The Journal 
of Politics 70, no. 4 (2008). 
19 Victor Shih, ""Nauseating" Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," The Journal 
of Politics 70, no. 4 (2008). 
20 Victor Shih, ""Nauseating" Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," The Journal 
of Politics 70, no. 4 (2008). 
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groups are neither willing nor able to defeat their rivals completely because of the equal 
balanced power and the necessity of power-sharing to maintain stability.21 Because of the 
more stable elite politics, Hu Jintao might be less eager to monitor followers’ loyalties 
through costly ideological campaigns than Jiang Zemin was. 
 Moreover, an institutionalized power succession system also leads to less demand in 
monitoring followers’ loyalties through ideological campaigns as well. In the past three 
decades, the CCP has taken impressive efforts to institutionalize its power succession 
system.22 As explained earlier, Jiang Zemin was appointed as the top leader by a sudden 
decision; however, both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping were scheduled as heir apparent for years 
in advance. Thus, they have more opportunities to obtain the knowledge of their existing 
followers before they take power than Jiang Zemin did.  
 Most importantly, the timings of launching ideological campaigns are very different. 
Jiang Zemin began to propose Three Represents and launch relevant campaigns nearly at the 
end of his term. As a departing leader, to maintain rather than to expand his power base was 
perhaps more rational to Jiang. At this time, Jiang might be less interested in using 
ideological campaigns to recruit new followers as it would not have been cost-effective. It 
was not very rational for provincial leaders to pander to the departing Jiang Zemin either 
because no-one knew the durability of Jiang’s influence after his retirement. It explains why 
non-Jiang protégés were less motivated than Jiang’s protégés to echo Jiang’s campaigns, as 
Shih’s study finds.    
 The campaigns of Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook of Development and Xi Jinping’s 
“China Dream”, however, were launched in the first few years of their terms. Both of these 
ideological banners clearly indicated the new leaders’ attempts to carry out a new vision and 
walk out of the shadow of their predecessors. At this time, as new top leaders, they might 
have been motivated to build their power bases for their rule; thus, recruiting new protégés 
through ideological campaigns matches their interests. For provincial leaders who are not 
new leaders’ protégés, they might be more willing to pander to new leaders. Thus, they might 
have been more motivated than those identified protégés to echo Hu’s ideological banner. In 
this sense, the different timing of launching ideological campaigns might completely overturn 
the manner of displaying loyalties in Hu Jintao’s term.   
 In short, the manner of displaying loyalty through ideological campaigns in Hu Jintao’s 
era might be very different from that in Jiang’s era because of the different timing of 
ideological campaigns and the changing elite politics.  
 
Measurement and Data 
 Given the above conjectures, this study tests the hypothesis of allegiance with the data 
between 2005 and 2012. In order to purge the possible effects of methodological difference, 
this study employs the similar research method and data analysis techniques to the Shih’s 
study. This study observes the number of ideological articles that were published on official 
newspapers （机关报）from all Chinese 31 provincial units except Shandong. As provincial 
official newspapers are directly controlled by provincial propaganda departments and their 
                                                          
21 Cheng Li, "The Powerful Factions among China's Rulers,"  (2012); Cheng Li, "The Battle for China's Top Nine Leadership Posts," The 
Washington Quarterly 35, no. 1 (2012); Cheng Li and Eve Cary, "The Last Year of Hu's Leadership: Hu's to Blame?," China Brief 11, no. 
23 (2011); Cheng Li, "China's Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or Weakness?," Asia Policy, no. 6 (2008). 
22 Jinghan Zeng, "Institutionalization of the Authoritarian Leadership in China: A Power Succession System with Chinese Characteristics?," 
Contemporary Politics 20, no. 3 (2014).  
7 
 
content is closely supervised by the provincial standing committee (省委常委会),23  the 
frequency of relevant articles captures the willingness of provincial leaders to publish 
relevant items.   
 The campaigns of Scientific Outlook of Development and Harmonious Society are 
chosen because they are the most influential ones in Hu Jintao’s era and the most 
representative in reflecting Hu’s personal authority. The time period between 2005 and 2012 
is chosen because it covers the life of these two campaigns. In addition, this study also 
observes Three Represents articles during the period of interest. The numbers of articles 
containing the phrase “Scientific Outlook of Development” （科学发展观）, “Harmonious 
Society” (和谐社会), or “Three Represents” (三个代表) during the period of interest are 
collected from the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (中国知网).  
 
Dependent Variables  
 The unit of analysis in this study is a province-year (it) covering 2005 to 2012. Similar 
to the previous study, I set the Z-score of the actual amount of articles published in a given 
province-year (it) observation as dependent variables. As indicated in Figures 1, 2 and 3, all 
three ideological campaigns have gone through a process of ups and downs. There are 
substantial annual fluctuations in the numbers of ideological articles published every year. If 
we do not take this effect into consideration, the annual difference rather than the effects of 
observed independent variables would explain the variation in article numbers. This paper 
uses Z-score to eliminate the effects of the annual difference in article numbers.  
Z score- SOD(it) =   (SODit  -  uit ) / бt 
 In the above equation, i is province and t is year. SODit is the actual article count of 
Scientific Outlook of Development in a given province-year observation and uit is the mean 
number of Scientific Outlook of Development articles across all provinces. бt is the standard 
deviation of the article count in a given province-year observation across all provinces. The 
setting of dependent variables in Harmonious Society and Three Represents campaigns is the 
same: Z score- HS(it) =   (HSit  -  uit ) / бt  and  Z score- TR(it) =   (TRit  -  uit ) / бt . 
 
                                                          
23 Victor Shih, ""Nauseating" Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," The Journal 
of Politics 70, no. 4 (2008); Guoguang Wu, "Command Communication: The Politics of Editorial Formulation in the People's Daily," The 
China Quarterly 137 (1994). 
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Figure 1: Median Numbers of Articles Mentioning “Scientific Outlook of Development” 
2005-2012 
 
Figure 2: Median Numbers of Articles Mentioning “Harmonious Society” 2005-2012 
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Figure 3: Median Numbers of Articles Mentioning “Three Represents” 2005-2012 
 
 
Main Variables of Interest  
 This study observes three political groups, Hu Jintao’s followers, the “Shanghai Gang”, 
and princelings. In order to study the volume of patron-client ties, I set up two statistical 
models – the ALLTIES model and the SUMTIES model – for each group. In the ALLTIES 
model, I use a dummy variable (ALLTIES(it)) to record patron-client ties. In a given province-
year, if the party secretary or governor belongs to a political group, this province-year is 
recorded as “1”, or “0” otherwise. For example, in 2009, the governor of Hunan province is 
Hu Jintao’s protégé but the party secretary is not, therefore, “ALLTIES with HJT(it)” in the 
“2009-Hunan” is recorded as “1”.  If both of them are, it would still be recorded as “1”.     
 If both the party secretary and governor in a province are, for example, Hu Jintao’s 
followers, this province might act differently from a province in which only one of them is 
Hu’s follower. The second statistical model helps to capture this dynamic. In the SUMTIES 
model, I develop an accumulative variable (SUMTIES(it)), which sums up the patron-client 
ties of both the governor and the party secretary in a given province-year. For example, if 
both the governor and the party secretary belong to the “Shanghai Gang”, then “SUMTIES 
Shanghai Gang(it)” in this province-year is recorded as “2”. If only one of them belong to this 
group, then it is recorded as “1”. If none, then “0”. The ALLTIES(it) variables measure 
whether or not patron-client ties have an impact on the provinces’ zeal to echo ideological 
campaigns and SUMTIES(it) gauges whether the volume of patron-client ties matters.   
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For those who favour factional conflicts between the “Shanghai Gang” and Communist 
Youth League, it can be argued that these two groups have different interests in publishing 
relevant ideological items. For example, if the governor of a province belongs to the 
“Shanghai Gang” and its party-secretary is Hu Jintao’s protégé, how will this province react 
to Three Represents and Scientific Outlook of Development campaigns? For the spirit of 
experimentation, I develop another accumulative variable called “Ties Shanghai Gang vs 
CCYL”. If one of the provincial leaders belongs to the “Shanghai Gang”, this variable will be 
recorded as “-1”; if both, then “-2”. If one of them belongs to Hu Jintao’s protégés, then 
record “1”; if both, then “2”. If the top two provincial leaders belong to “Shanghai Gang” and 
CCYL respectively, this variable will be recorded as “0”. This variable attempts to capture 
whether the offset of patron clients ties has an impact on provincial leaders’ zeal to echo 
ideological campaigns. The assumption of this variable is potentially flawed in a few aspects. 
First, it assumes that the “Shanghai Gang” and Hu’s protégés have completely different 
interests in publishing the ideological banners of Hu and Jiang. However, there is no clear 
line between the “Shanghai Gang” and Hu’s protégés. Li Yuanchao, for example, belongs to 
both groups. In addition, those two groups might not be mortal enemies in such a manner. 
Second, it assumes that both the top officials will make the same effort to endorse their 
patron’s ideological item and reject that of their patron’s rival, which might not be the case.      
Notably, China certainly does not have a factional politics like western democratic parties 
which show clearly who belongs to which faction.24 There is also a distinction between the 
importance of patronage and the formation of factions.25 Political faction implies ties between 
members including horizontal ones, but patronage is more based on hierarchical relationships 
with loose or no contacts horizontally at lower levels. Factionalism also implies that people 
are aware that they are in a group together. As such, in this article, factional ties indeed refer 
to patron-client ties that created vertical links rather than horizontal ones. The patron-client 
ties data of this study rely on Li Cheng’s extensive studies of Chinese elite politics.26  
 
Key Hypotheses 
 For the purpose of this study, I test the key hypotheses and alterative hypotheses to 
show whether provincial leaders’ factional ties have an impact on their zeal to echo 
ideological campaigns.  
Hypothesis 1 (Null Hypothesis): According to this hypothesis, none of the patron-client ties 
variables can explain the variations in ideological articles. The implication of this hypothesis 
is that strategic political consideration is not a reason why those campaigns are launched.   
Hypothesis 2 (Signaling Loyalty): According to this hypothesis, the variations in ideological 
articles are explained by the indicator of patron-client ties. This is to say, ideological 
campaigns provide a way for provincial leaders to signal their loyalty to central leaders by 
actively echoing those campaigns. 
Hypothesis 2a (Monitoring Loyalties): As the previous study suggests, factional patron uses 
ideological campaigns to monitor the loyalty of existing followers. If this is true, existing 
followers should be more active to echo the ideological campaigns of their factional patrons. 
                                                          
24 Jinghan Zeng, "What Matters Most in Selecting Top Chinese Leaders? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis," Journal of Chinese Political 
Science 18, no. 3 (2013).:227-228  
25 Jinghan Zeng, "What Matters Most in Selecting Top Chinese Leaders? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis," Journal of Chinese Political 
Science 18, no. 3 (2013).:227-228  
26 Cheng Li, "After Hu, Who? : China's Provincial Leaders Await Promotion," China Leadership Monitor 1 (2002); Cheng Li, "China’s 
Midterm Jockeying: Gearing up for 2012(Part 1: Provincial Chiefs)," China Leadership Monitor, no. 31 (2010); Cheng Li, "Hu's Followers: 
Provincial Leaders with Backgrounds in the Youth League," China Leadership Monitor 3 (2002). 
11 
 
Thus, we might expect a positive and significant relationship between the indicator of Hu 
Jintao’s protégés and the frequency of Scientific Outlook of Development articles, between 
the indicator of Hu Jintao’s protégés and the frequency of the Harmonious Society article, 
and between the indicator of the “Shanghai Gang” and the frequency of the Three 
Represents article. 
Hypothesis 2b (Recruiting New Members): As explained earlier, for those identified protégés 
who have other ways of signalling loyalties, they do not have to grovel publicly to their 
patron through ideological campaigns. Ideological campaigns, however, are one of the few 
opportunities for those officials who have fewer connections with top leaders to which they 
can pander. In order to join the top leader’s coalition, they might be more motivated to echo 
ideological campaigns than identified protégés. If true, it will produce a negative and 
significant relationship between the indicator of Hu Jintao’s protégés and the frequency of 
Scientific Outlook of Development articles, between the indicator of Hu Jintao’s protégés and 
the frequency of Harmonious Society articles, and between the indicator of the “Shanghai 
Gang” and the frequency of the Three Represents articles.   
Hypothesis 2c (Political Struggle): According to this hypothesis, political conflict plays a 
role in explaining the variation of ideological articles. If we assume the coalitions of Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao have conflicting interests, their protégés might tend to discourage them 
from publishing ideological items belonging to their patron’s rival. As they have already 
been protected by a powerful coalition, they do not have to pander to their patron’s rival. In 
addition, besides the normal cost of public grovelling as explained earlier, they might bear 
extra costs of betraying the original coalition if they choose to over praise their patron’s 
rival. If this is the case, we might expect a negative and significant relationship between the 
indicator of Hu Jintao’s protégés and the frequency of Three Represents articles, between the 
indicator of the “Shanghai Gang” and the frequency of the Scientific Outlook of 
Development articles, and between the indicator of the “Shanghai Gang” and the frequency 
of the Harmonious Society articles.  
 
Three Control Variables  
 In addition to patron-client ties, Shih’s study finds that the level of economic 
development, professional experience in propaganda work, and fiscal dependence of a 
province also play roles in affecting the provinces’ zeal to publish ideological item.27 As 
ideological shift is often followed by a series of policy changes, new ideological banner is 
often related to new economic policy. Thus, the level of economic development might affect 
the provinces’ zeal to echo certain ideological campaigns. Provincial leaders’ professional 
experience in propaganda unit also plays a role as they may tend to publish more ideological 
items simply because of their expertise and experiences no matter whose ideological banners 
are. Fiscal dependence of a province also matters as it may affect the province’s zeal to 
support policies from the central government. As those variables might affect the frequency 
of ideological articles in a given province-year, it is highly necessary to control their effects 
so that we can know the actual impact of patron-client ties.  
 For example, if we find that the provincial units of “Shanghai Gang” are less likely to 
echo ideological campaigns, we cannot reach the conclusion that this is owing to “Shanghai 
                                                          
27 Victor Shih, ""Nauseating" Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," The Journal 
of Politics 70, no. 4 (2008). 
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Gang” membership matters unless we purge the effects of economic development. As most of 
the “Shanghai Gang” members are governing affluent areas, their provinces’ willingness to 
echo ideological campaigns are not only affected by their patron-client ties but also the level 
of economic development in their governed regions. Similarly, as most of Hu Jintao’s 
protégés who rose from the Communist Youth League have usually worked in the 
propaganda area,28 their desire to publish ideological items might be affected by their past 
work experience. Thus, it is important to purge this effect for capturing the actual impact of 
their ties with Hu Jintao.    
 In order to capture the actual impact of patron-client ties, this study retains all those 
control variables for eliminating the effects of other variables. The collection of relevant data 
strictly follows the method of the previous study in order to eliminate the effects of 
methodological difference.  
 
Data 
 Table 1 lists the summary statistics of the relevant variables. For the dependent 
variables, the mean and the standard deviation of all Z scores should be 0 and 1 respectively. 
The category of the actual account of articles lists the numbers of relevant ideological articles. 
The average numbers of articles mentioning “Three Represents”, “Scientific Outlook of 
Development”, and “Harmonious Society” in provincial official newspapers between 2005 
and 2012 are 93, 459, and 226 respectively. The mean of GDP per capita in our observation is 
26,104 yuan while the standard deviation is 17,090 yuan. Fiscal dependence is counted by 
local revenue minus local expenditure divided by local revenue in a given year. The average 
province ran 169% fiscal shortfall (Fiscal Dependence(it)) in a given year, while the standard 
deviation was 2.42109. The variable of propaganda is the combined years of the governor and 
the party secretary’s experiences in areas of propaganda work.29 While the average of this 
variable is 3.1 years, that of Henan province from 2005 to 2012 is 30 years. Finally, the 
variable “ALL TIES with HJT(it)” shows that 51% of the observed  provincial leadership 
(province-year) has existing ties with Hu Jintao. The provincial leadership in 6.6% and 11% 
of the observation (province-year) belongs to the “Shanghai Gang” and princelings 
respectively.  
   
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Relevant Variables  
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Actual 
Account of 
Articles 
TR(it) 240 93.42083 82.53267 
SOD(it) 240 459.0583 251.3672 
HS(it) 240 226.0833 179.7312 
Dependent 
Variables 
Z score-SOD(it) 240 -1.28e-07 .9852469 
Z score-HS(it) 240 -6.34e-09 .9852468 
Z score-TR(it) 240 -7.07e-09 .9852468 
Main  
Variables of 
Interest 
ALL TIES with HJT(it) 240 .5166667 .5007665 
SUM TIES with HJT(it) 240 .5708333 .6026296 
ALL TIES Shanghai Gang(it) 240 .0666667 .2499651 
                                                          
28 Cheng Li, "Hu's Policy Shift and the Tuanpai's Coming-of-Age," China Leadership Monitor, no. 15 (2005). 
29 It includes experiences of various propaganda units (宣传单位). 
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SUM TIES Shanghai Gang(it) 240 .0916667 .3658162 
ALL TIES Princeling(it) 240 .1125 .316641 
TIES Shanghai Gang vs CCYL (it) 240 .5166667 .7024563 
Control 
Variables 
GDP per capital(it) 210 26104.04 17090.01 
Fiscal Dependence(it) 210 1.694619 2.420879 
Sum Propaganda(it) 240 3.1125 5.726676 
 
Data Analysis: PCSE-AR 1 
Similarly to the Shih’s previous study, I employ estimations with panel-corrected 
standard errors and first order autocorrelation (PCSE-AR 1) to test thoroughly the ALLTIES 
model and SUMTIES model. PCSE provides more accurate results than ordinary least 
squared (OLS) when dealing with time-series cross-section data. Given the panel nature of 
my dataset, OLS is not optimal because it assumes there are no serial correlation and spatial 
correlations of the dataset.30 Thus, Beck and Katz’s PCSE is employed to correct within the 
group heteroskedasticity and cross-section of error. 31   The first-order autocorrelation 
coefficient (AR1) is used to deal with serial correlation of the data. 
 
Finding  
 Table 2, 3, 4, and 5 report the estimated effects of provincial leaders’ patron-client 
ties on their zeal to echo ideological adaption between 2005 and 2012. First and most 
importantly, this study finds a negative relationship between the patron-client ties of 
provincial leaders and their zeal to echo ideological campaigns. Table 2 reports the robust 
and striking patterns. The ALLTIES model shows that provincial leadership’s ties with Hu 
Jintao significantly reduce their zeal to echo the Scientific Outlook of Development 
campaigns. If one of the provincial leaders is Hu Jintao’s follower, the main provincial 
newspapers will produce on average 22.6% Scientific Outlook of Development articles fewer 
than the province in which none of the provincial leaders is Hu Jintao’s follower, all else 
being equal. This finding remains robust at the 0.05 level even if I remove all other control 
variables save only the variable of GDP per capita.32 The SUMTIES model shows that the 
volume of patron-client ties with Hu Jintao did not have a significant impact on provincial 
leaders’ zeal to echo Scientific Outlook of Development.  
Table 3 reports the estimated effects of provincial leaders’ membership of the 
“Shanghai Gang” on their provinces in publishing Three Represents articles. The negative 
coefficient of the “Shanghai Gang” denotes that provincial leaders of the “Shanghai Gang” 
are less likely to publish Three Represents articles. If one of the provincial leaders belongs to 
the “Shanghai Gang”, the main provincial newspapers on average will produce 43.77% fewer 
Three Represents articles in a given year, all else being equal (ALLTIES model). 33  In 
addition, the volume of the “Shanghai Gang” membership has a significant impact on their 
zeal to echo the Three Represents campaigns. If both the party secretary and governor belong 
to the “Shanghai Gang”, the main newspaper of this province will produce 23% Three 
                                                          
30 Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data," American Political Science 
Review 89, no. 3 (1995). 
31 Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz, "Time-Series--Cross-Section Issues: Dynamics 2004." 
32 The statistical outcome is available at my research page.  
33 This finding has taken the level of economic development as a control. Most members of the “Shanghai Gang” are based in affluent areas; 
the control variable GDP per capita helps to eliminate the effect of economic development.  
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Represents articles fewer than the province in which only one of its leaders is a “Shanghai 
Gang” member (SUMTIES model).  
The above two findings confirms the previous conjectures that the manner of displaying 
loyalty had changed in Hu Jintao’s term. Hu Jintao’s followers were less likely to echo Hu’s 
Scientific Outlook of Development campaign and the “Shanghai Gang” was less motivated to 
praise Jiang’s Three Represents campaign. In other words, the role of ideological campaigns 
had shifted from “maintenance” (monitoring loyalties of followers) in Jiang Zemin’s era into 
“recruitment” (recruiting new protégés) in Hu Jintao’s era.  
In addition to clients’ responses to their patron’s campaigns, I also examine their 
reaction to the ideological innovation of their patron’s rival. Table 4 reveals the impact of 
“Shanghai Gang” membership on the provincial leaders’ zeal to echo Scientific Outlook of 
Development campaigns. It shows that provincial leaders of the “Shanghai Gang” are less 
likely to echo Hu’s Scientific Outlook of Development campaigns.34 The ALLTIES model 
shows that if one of the provincial leaders is a “Shanghai Gang” member, the main provincial 
newspaper on average publishes 46.23% fewer Scientific Outlook of Development articles 
than a province which does not have a leader belonging to the “Shanghai Gang”. The 
SUMTIES model denotes that the volume of “Shanghai Gang” membership has a significant 
impact as well. If both provincial leaders are members of the “Shanghai Gang”, the main 
provincial newspaper on average publishes 24.72% fewer Scientific Outlook of Development 
articles than the province in which only one of its leaders is a “Shanghai Gang” member. This 
pattern matches the previous conjecture that protégés of a senior leader do not have to pander 
to other senior leaders at their own expense because they have already received their 
coalition’s support.   
In addition to the impact of factional factors, the policy preference perhaps also 
discourages “Shanghai Gang” leaders’ zeal to echo Scientific Outlook of Development. 
Scientific Outlook of Development promotes a fairer distribution of resources among Chinese 
provinces. Under Scientific Outlook of Development, the administration of Hu Jintao and 
Wen Jiabao intended to promote regional equality in order to achieve more sustainable 
development. Specially, they designed many economic and social policies to increase the 
flow of resources to poorer inland provinces and thus lead to a more redistributive overall 
budget.35 This rebalancing of resources has led to some discontent of leaders in affluent areas, 
especially those who rose from Shanghai. For example, the fall of the former head of 
Shanghai Chen Liangyu is known for his opposition to the macro socio-economic policies of 
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao that are less favoured in coastal regions.36  
The variables “Ties Shanghai Gang vs CCYL(it)” and “ALL TIES Princeling(it)” do not 
show significant impacts on either Scientific Outlook of Development or Three Represents.37 
Provincial leaders’ ties with Hu Jintao also do not have a significant impact on their zeal to 
echo the Three Represents campaigns.  
Moreover, Table 5 reports the impact of patron-client ties on the standardized 
frequency of Harmonious Society articles. It finds that there is no evidence that provincial 
leaders’ patron-client ties play a role in affecting the variation of Harmonious Society articles. 
                                                          
34 This finding has taken the level of economic development (GDP per capita) into consideration.  
35 Naughton， Barry, "China's Left Tilt: Pendulum Swing or Midcourse Correction?," in China's Changing Political Landscape, ed. Cheng 
Li (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). 
36 Cheng Li, "Was the Shanghai Gang Shanghaied? The Fall of Chen Liangyu and the Survival of Jiang Zemin's Faction," China Leadership 
Monitor, no. 20 (2007). 
37 Statistical outcome is available on my research page. 
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This finding suggests that strategic political consideration is not a reason why Harmonious 
Society campaigns are launched. Then why did patron-clients with Hu Jintao and “Shanghai 
Gang” membership matter to Scientific Outlook of Development but not to Harmonious 
Society? A possible interpretation is that Hu Jintao stakes more of his personal authority on 
Scientific Outlook of Development rather than Harmonious Society as demonstrated by the 
fact that the CCP Constitution incorporated Scientific Outlook of Development instead of 
Harmonious Society in 2012.  
 
Table 2: The Impact of Ties with Hu Jintao on the Standardized Frequency of 
“Scientific Outlook of Development” Articles in Provincial Newspapers (2005-2012) 
 ALLTIES model SUMTIES model 
Dependent Variable: Z score-SOD(it)                           Coefficient 
                                              (Standard Error) 
All Ties with HJT(it) -0.2261232*  
(0.1132055) 
------ 
Sum Ties with HJT(it) ------  -0.1013375    
(0.0925824)  
GDP per capital(it) -8.98e-06* 
 (3.92e-06) 
-8.18e-06*  
(3.81e-06) 
Fiscal Dependence(it) 0.0001795** 
 (0.0155864) 
0.1303515**  
(0.0477479) 
Sum Propaganda(it) 0.0001795 
 (0.0155864) 
-0.0003309  
(.0155022) 
CONSTANT 0.1357196 
 (0.1267269) 
0.0531882 
 (0.1132999) 
 N=210 
Rho= 0.5927615 
N=210 
Rho= 0.5883423 
Note: *p < 0.05， ** p < 0.01   
 
Table 3: The Impact of “Shanghai Gang” membership on the Standardized Frequency 
of “Three Represents” Articles in Provincial Newspapers (2005-2012) 
 ALLTIES model SUMTIES Model 
Dependent Variable: Z score-TR(it)                              Coefficient 
                                                 (Standard Error) 
All Ties Shanghai Gang(it) -0.4377569*  
(0.1949907) 
------ 
Sum Ties Shanghai Gang(it) ------ -0.2396642*  
(0.1169595) 
GDP per capital(it) 5.50e-06  
(3.56e-06) 
4.84e-06  
(3.49e-06) 
Fiscal Dependence(it) 0.2829655**  
(0.033309) 
0.2825434**  
(0.033776) 
Sum Propaganda(it) 0.0297698* 
 (0.0135261) 
0.0257952*  
(0.0125662) 
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CONSTANT -0.6809872**  
(0.1397268) 
-0.6576854**  
(0.1367641) 
 N=210 N=210 
 Rho= 0.4855273 Rho=0.4981485 
Note: *p < 0.05， ** p < 0.01   
  
Table 4: The Impact of “Shanghai Gang” membership on the Standardized Frequency 
of “Scientific Outlook of Development” Articles in Provincial Newspapers (2005-2012) 
 ALLTIES model SUMTIES Model 
Dependent Variable: Z score-SOD(it)                          Coefficient 
                                                (Standard Error) 
All Ties Shanghai Gang(it) -0.4623632**  
(0.203747) 
------ 
Sum Ties Shanghai Gang(it) ------ -0.247273*  
(0.1166842) 
GDP per capital(it) -6.43e-06  
(3.63e-06) 
-7.07e-06  
(3.73e-06) 
Fiscal Dependence(it) 0.1308801** 
 (0.0488001) 
0.1300964**  
(0.048087)  
Sum Propaganda(it) 0.0078109  
(0.0162017) 
0.004347 
 (0.0158783) 
CONSTANT -0.040598  
(0.1043766  ) 
-0.0198136  
(0.1063964) 
 N=210 N=210 
 Rho= 0.5779312 Rho=0.5677991 
Note: *p < 0.05， ** p < 0.01   
 
Table 5: The Impact of Patron-client Ties on the Standardized Frequency of 
“Harmonious Society” Articles in Provincial Newspapers (2005-2012) 
Dependent Variable: Z score HS(it)     
 Coefficient  
(Standard Error) 
P value 
All Ties with HJT(it) .0985304 
(.1336957) 
0.461 
All Ties Shanghai Gang(it) -.1068175 
(.2611175) 
0.682 
ALL TIES Princeling(it) .2588506  
(.1656429) 
0.118 
GDP per capital(it) -1.42e-06 
(4.19e-06) 
0.735 
Fiscal Dependence(it) .1667347*  
(.0740597) 
0.024 
Sum Propaganda(it) .0159225  
(.0167762) 
0.343 
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CONSTANT -.2661044  
(.1621296) 
 
 N=210 
Rho= .5691604 
 
Note: *p < 0.05， ** p < 0.01 
 
Conclusion  
This article studies the manners of displaying loyalties through ideological campaigns 
in Hu Jintao’s era. Through a content analysis of provincial official newspapers between 
2005 and 2012, it finds a completely contrary impact of patron-client ties with the previous 
study. Several key findings can be highlighted. First, Hu Jintao’s protégés are less likely to 
echo Hu’s Scientific Outlook of Development campaign. Second, “Shanghai Gang” members 
are less willing to praise both Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents and Hu’s Scientific Outlook of 
Development. Third, the volume of “Shanghai Gang” membership has a significant impact on 
the variations of Three Represents and Scientific Outlook of Development articles. These 
findings suggest that the strategic function of ideological campaigns has completely changed 
from monitoring the loyalties of existing followers in Jiang Zemin’s era into recruiting new 
followers in Hu Jintao’s era. Finally, the variables of patron-client ties cannot explain the 
variation of Harmonious Society articles. This is to say, unlike the campaigns of Three 
Represents and Scientific Outlook of Development, there is no empirical evidence to support 
that the Harmonious Society campaign was launched to discern local leaders’ loyalties. 
This article argues that the decreasing need to monitor followers’ loyalties because of a 
more stable elite politics on the one hand, and the increasing need to recruit new protégés 
owing to top leaders’ different strategic uses of ideological campaigns on the other hand, led 
to the changing manners of displaying loyalties through ideological campaigns in post-Deng 
China. The weakness of authoritarian regimes lies in their power distribution. The majority of 
authoritarian leaders are overthrown by the ruling elites rather than the masses.38 The CCP 
knows its weakness well. Since the 1980s, the CCP has made impressive efforts to 
institutionalize its power succession system in order to ensure a smooth cycle of political 
elites and reduce the negative effects of power struggles. 39 Institutional development has 
dramatically changed China’s elite politics, as evidenced by the second smooth and orderly 
leadership transition in the history of the People’s Republic of China in 2012. My empirical 
study on the selection bias of the 18th Politburo Standing Committee members demonstrates 
that institutional rules have become a key factor in selecting Chinese top leaders. 40  
Arguably, the institutionalization of power succession has produced more stable elite 
politics in Hu Jintao’s era. Jiang Zemin was forced to put his protégés into the vital sectors in 
order to stay in power. By contrast, Hu Jintao was known as a master of maintaining 
consensus among factions. This is because a more stable elite politics had allowed Hu to do 
so. Unlike Jiang, Hu Jintao’s position as the party head had not been seriously challenged, 
although power struggle remained intense during his terms. Nowadays, factional groups are 
neither willing nor able to defeat their rivals completely because of the equal balanced power 
                                                          
38 Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2012).:5 
39 Jinghan Zeng, "Institutionalization of the Authoritarian Leadership in China: A Power Succession System with Chinese Characteristics?," 
Contemporary Politics 20, no. 3 (2014).  
40 Jinghan Zeng, "What Matters Most in Selecting Top Chinese Leaders? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis," Journal of Chinese Political 
Science 18, no. 3 (2013). 
18 
 
and the necessity of power-sharing to maintain stability.41 As a consequence of a more stable 
elite politics, Hu Jintao did not have to rely on his coalition as heavily as Jiang Zemin did. It 
dramatically led to the decreasing need to identify loyal followers through costly ideological 
campaigns.    
More importantly, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao had very different strategic goals in 
launching campaigns for their ideological innovation: Jiang wanted to maintain his influence 
after retirement, whilst Hu was less motivated to do so. As explained earlier, Three 
Represents was first proposed by Jiang Zemin in 2000 and Jiang handed over the top 
positions of the party and the state to Hu Jintao two years later. Towards the end of his term, 
it was important for Jiang to select loyal followers to put into the top authority in order to 
maintain his influence. To achieve this goal, promoting identified protégés was more 
effective than promoting junior protégés who only joined Jiang’s coalition because of 
reliability and political capital.  
As identified protégés followed Jiang Zemin for many years and Jiang knew their 
weakness well, they would pay higher cost than junior protégés if they betray Jiang. Thus, 
generally speaking, identified protégés tend to be more loyal and reliable than junior protégés. 
In addition, identified protégés tend to have more political capitals than junior protégés 
because they usually have higher party ranks and more experiences in dealing with political 
conflicts, so promoting those identified protégés into top positions of authority usually leads 
to less resistance. In this sense, at the time of launching the Three Represents campaign, Jiang 
might be more interested in monitoring the loyalties of identified protégés who were more 
reliable and eligible for the top leadership, rather than recruiting new follower who still 
needed Jiang’s protection.    
Observing followers’ reactions to Three Represents campaigns provides a way to 
identify who is loyal. As explained earlier, followers bear the social cost of being dispersed 
by others and – more importantly – the political cost of forgoing the opportunities of joining 
other coalitions. Thus, their echoing of Three Represents campaigns sent credible signals to 
Jiang Zemin. Those identified protégés might have taken this as an opportunity to win Jiang’s 
trust so that they could be promoted to a higher position. From the perspective of provincial 
officials who were not Jiang’s protégés, to praise Jiang’s Three Represents was costly 
because Jiang Zemin was retiring soon and no-one knew the durability of his influence after 
his retirement. For those who had not joined any coalition, to pander to the coming leader 
rather than a departing leader was more rational. It explains why Jiang Zemin’s protégés are 
more likely to echo Three Represents campaigns in the previous study.  
The factional calculation of Hu’s ideological campaign is different from that of Jiang. 
Scientific Outlook of Development was mainly proposed after Jiang’s full retirement in 2004. 
At this time, by promoting Hu’s own formula of the party’s guiding ideology, Hu Jintao 
intended to build his personal authority as the new leaders. The ideological campaigns of 
Hu’s Scientific Outlook of Development serve as a tool to carry out a new vision and walk 
out of the shadow of the predecessor Jiang Zemin. To Hu Jintao and his coalition, Scientific 
Outlook of Development campaigns helped to identify the political stance of local officials 
and to recruit active respondents selectively. Identified protégés of Hu Jintao have many 
connections with Hu, so they have many other ways of displaying loyalties. Thus, they do not 
have to over-praise Scientific Outlook of Development in public at their own expense. Those 
who have not joined Hu’s coalition, however, have far fewer connections, and thus 
                                                          
41 Cheng Li, "The Powerful Factions among China's Rulers,"  (2012); Cheng Li, "The Battle for China's Top Nine Leadership Posts," The 
Washington Quarterly 35, no. 1 (2012); Cheng Li and Eve Cary, "The Last Year of Hu's Leadership: Hu's to Blame?," China Brief 11, no. 
23 (2011); Cheng Li, "China's Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or Weakness?," Asia Policy, no. 6 (2008). 
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ideological campaigns are one of few channels through which they can pander to the new 
leader Hu Jintao. Thus, they are more motivated to echo Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook of 
Development campaigns.   
“Shanghai Gang” members’ identity undermined their willing to pander Hu because of 
the risk of losing trust in Jiang’s coalition and their close ties with Jiang would make it harder 
for them to win Hu’s trust. Thus, “Shanghai Gang” members are less likely to echo Hu 
Jintao’s Scientific Outlook of Development campaigns. Similarly to the pattern of Hu’s 
protégés’ reactions to Scientific Outlook of Development, the “Shanghai Gang” has already 
been identified as members of Jiang Zemin’s coalition, and they have many other ways to 
signal their loyalties to their coalition. On the contrary, for those who wish to join Jiang’s 
coalition, they might be more active in publishing Three Represents items. As such, 
“Shanghai Gang” members are less likely to praise Jiang’s Three Represents item in Hu’s era.  
All in all, the strategic function of ideological campaigns has changed in Hu Jintao’s 
era. While Fukuyama’s “The End of History” essay predicts the “end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution”,42 ideology has been constantly adapting in China. The party-state has 
put great amounts of energy and human capital in modernizing ideology from Jiang Zemin’s 
“Three Represents”, Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Outlook of Development” and “Harmonious 
Society”, to Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. As this study suggests, ideology is by no mean 
obsolete. In addition to its legitimating function, Chinese top leaders rely on it to build the 
authority of the new leadership and to claim their right to rule. Future research could look 
into the strategic use of Xi Jinping’s ideological banners.  
                                                          
42 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," The National Interest Summer 1989 (1989). 
